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The most fundamental analytical errors that lead to overstated projected regional economic 
impacts (ex ante) are demand based: (1) failure to subtract local sources of spending and non-
local uses of spending from the budgets of subject organizations or events; (2) erroneous 
attribution of all ancillary spending as causally related to the existence of the subject 
organization or event; and (3) failure to adapt multipliers to specific regions, including the failure 
to recognize the relationship between the likely size of the initial net spending injections and the 
speed with which those injections “leak” from the target region.   But those ex post verification 
studies in sports that have generally found very small realized economic impacts resulting from 
even mega-events like Super Bowls have tended to emphasize supply-side infrastructure capacity 
constraints in local economies that generate significant crowding-out effects.  This issue is 
reviewed with a focus on the differential treatment of crowding-out effects in the sports versus 
the arts (cultural sector) literatures, and evaluates whether there are legitimate reasons why ex 
ante arts economic impact studies have generally ignored supply constraints.  Interestingly, the 
only real ex post verification study done in the arts (Skinner, 2006) found remarkable similarity 
between the empirical impact results and what would likely have been predicted by an ex ante 
impact study (for the case of blockbuster museum exhibits in Jackson, Mississippi), in contrast to 
the usual sports event finding.       
 




* Initially Prepared for Presentation at the Conference: Lasting Effects: Assessing the Future of 
Economic Impact Analysis, Pocantico Conference Center, Tarrytown, New York May 12-14, 
2004 (Sponsored by the Cultural Policy Center, the Harris School, University of Chicago. 
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The Supply Constraint Problem in Economic Impact Analysis: An Arts/Sports Disparity 
 
I.  Introduction 
The major technical errors that can be made in traditional economic impact analysis are 
well understood by all but the most inexperienced practitioners.1  The three most common are 
demand-side errors: (1) the spending diversion direct base error (i.e. the failure to subtract local 
sources of funds and non-local uses of funds from subject organization or event budgets and 
other spending data sources), (2) the ancillary spending induced base error (i.e. incorrectly 
attributing all complementary good spending by non-local visitors to the existence of a particular 
subject organization or event, and (3) the indirect impact multiplier error (i.e. failing to adapt the 
multiplier to the specific sized region by not recognizing the commonly negative relationship 
between the size of the direct and induced spending bases and the relevant multiplier).2    
However, even highly trained analysts do not as consistently avoid two other potentially 
significant problems. The first, which is the focus of this paper, is the failure to consider the 
severity of supply capacity constraints in the local economy that may generate as much as 100 
percent crowding out or displacement of one type of visitor spending by another type of visitor 
spending.  While this is focused on the alleged limitations of the hospitality sector and the local 
transportation and related infrastructure, it is more broadly linked to the potential inability of a 
local economy to significantly expand its output in response to alleged massive injections of 
visitor spending demands linked to “mega-events.”  
The failure to detect this problem is in turn linked to an “ex post verification error” that 
results from the absence of empirical testing of regional economic impact projections, either due 
to inadequate data or motivation to test those results.  Cultural economic impact studies have 
                                                 
1  Seaman (2002) distinguishes between “naïve economic impact models” (NEIM) that fail to avoid these errors, and 
hence systematically overstate net economic impacts (measured as incremental output, income, employment and tax 
revenues), and “sophisticated economic impact models” (SEIM) that properly adjust for these problems, and hence 
generate economic impact results as low as $0 in some (perhaps many) cases.  However, since spending based 
economic impacts are incomplete versions of the “full economic impact,” conditions are identified in which NEIM 
results may reasonably approximate a more accurate conceptualization of full economic impact that also includes 
consumer surplus and option-type values as typically addressed by contingent valuation models (CVM).    
 
2  Schaffer (1999), e.g., provides a comprehensive technical review of the methodological strengths and weaknesses 
of regional economic impact analysis.  Baade and Dye (1988) was an early important evaluation of economic impact 
methods.  The particular names applied to the analytical errors identified above, and some others below, are derived 
from Seaman (2003a).  Crompton (1995) identifies eleven “sources of misapplication” in the economic impact 
analysis of sports facilities and events. 
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nearly ignored this problem, while recent sports studies have potentially overstated its 
significance.   Interestingly, the only real ex post verification study in the arts (Skinner, 2006) 
acknowledges the issue of capacity constraints (in fact, citing the original version of this paper 
from the University of Chicago conference in 2004; see the * note on p. 1 above) but finds 
seemingly little evidence of its significance in the case of blockbuster museum exhibits in 
Jackson, Mississippi.  Since such empirical studies of the “real” rather than the projected 
economic impacts of arts events are so rare, this is suggestive but hardly determinative of a 
significant difference in the importance of capacity constraints in the arts compared to the sports 
sectors of local economies.     
 The second rarely resolved issue is the “aggregation problem,” which can become even 
more severe when combined with supply constraints.  While space limitations prevent a full 
analysis of this problem here, this refers to the conceptual dilemmas created by (a) the common 
practice of separately deriving the economic impacts within any defined region of individual 
organizations or events (usually in independent studies done by different analysts with varied 
and distinct sponsors), and (b) the occasional attempt to derive separable economic impacts from 
the same event or organization for different aggregations of the region, most commonly growing 
in scope from the central city, to the entire city, to the metropolitan area, to the entire state (or 
other applicable regional entity).    
 The aggregation problem might be confused with the “policy interpretation, partial vs. 
general equilibrium error,” whereby it is falsely presumed that the demonstration of a positive 
net economic impact from any one project is a sufficient condition for potential public sector 
investment without first comparing the rates of return from alternative uses of such funding.  
While this reflects a failure to see the “big” (aggregate) picture, it is quite distinct from the 
aggregation problem just described.   The general equilibrium policy error warns against 
considering tax-financed support prior to a comparison of the economic impacts of competing 
projects.  By contrast, the aggregation problem addresses conceptual challenges to properly 
measuring those individual economic impacts in the first place.3   
 
3 One particular challenge that the author has faced includes the competing claims made by proponents of Atlanta 
Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport and the Georgia World Congress Center (GWCC), both critical “engines of 
local growth,” but with the airport viewing itself as the essential conduit for large portions of conventioneers and 
other visitors to the Atlanta area, and the GWCC viewing itself as the initial reason for most of those “destination” 
(in contrast to the huge base of “transit”) passengers to need the services of the airport in the first place.  Even 
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As described, all competent analysts are aware of the general equilibrium policy error and 
warn that, at best, a positive net economic impact (on jobs, income, output, and tax revenues) 
may be a necessary but certainly is not a sufficient condition for justifying public investment in a 
project.4   However, the aggregation problem is typically either beyond the scope of any one 
economic impact study, or so conceptually challenging as to be poorly handled despite attempts 
to confront it.  Again, this topic cannot be fully developed in this particular paper. 
What is addressed more thoroughly here is the fascinating disparity in the way that sports 
economists have handled the supply constraint problem in contrast to cultural economists – even 
cultural economists who have been extremely critical of economic impact studies (including the 
author, who also has conducted many sports impact studies; see below).  In short, while sports 
economists certainly make the appropriate criticisms of the three (and more) previously listed 
demand-based errors, they have elevated the failure to consider supply constraints into perhaps 
the pre-eminent conceptual mistake exhibited by short-run spending impact analysis.   
Porter (1999, 2001a, 200b) takes the almost shocking position that the mega-sports event 
in the United States, the National Football League’s (NFL) Super Bowl, has essentially yielded 
zero net economic spending-based benefits to host cities.  Baade and Matheson (2000) conclude 
that the 1999 Super Bowl in Miami yielded only about 10 percent of the estimated impact (i.e. 
$36.5 million instead of $365.0 million), and further conclude that Super Bowls generally yield 
actual impacts ranging from about $21 million to $32 million.  By contrast, the average predicted 
                                                                                                                                                             
though I have conducted studies of both facilities, they were separate studies over slightly different time periods, 
raising the interesting question of how an integrated study of both facilities done at the same time might have 
differed, and more directly attacked any possible double-counting problems.  A more recent example of a study that 
did require an explicit approach to this aggregation problem was my simultaneous analysis of the pending Georgia 
Aquarium (to open in 2005) and the New World of Coca-Cola (to be relocated from elsewhere in downtown Atlanta 
as part of the overall Aquarium project).  I was asked to derive separate economic impacts for both projects 
individually, as well as for the integrated project, and was later asked to further incorporate the independent 
economic effects of adding a “multi-use entertainment complex of retail shops, a hotel and condominium housing” 
after having already done the analysis of the Aquarium and the Coke museum.  Separate impacts upon the City of 
Atlanta (as distinct from the metropolitan area) and the state of Georgia were requested. To further complicate 
matters, Coca-Cola and the Marcus Foundation (sponsor of the Aquarium project) alternately viewed themselves as 
collaborators for the success of this common integrated project, and competitors in claiming significant regional 
economic benefits from their individual parts of the project.  Since the findings of this study have not yet been 
released, and a strict confidentiality agreement had to be signed regarding the data, the model that was developed to 
deal with these analytical challenges cannot be discussed here.  
 
4  Of course, the long-standing welfare analysis of public subsidies linked to externality, public good, and merit good 
arguments does not focus on such short run spending based impacts at all, except in an indirect way related to 
regional factor rents that might not be fully captured by those generating them, hence presenting a kind of 
externality problem.        
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impact of 13 Super Bowls measured in 1992 dollars is $252 million (Depken, II and Wilson, 
2003, Table 1).  The Major League Baseball All Star (MLB) Game fares even worse, with 
essentially negative economic impacts to host cities since 1973 (Baade and Matheson, 2001).   
Nothing like these severe results is even hinted at in the many economic impact studies 
done of arts festivals and other cultural events. The unavoidable question is whether arts 
economists, despite their own critical view of economic impact studies, have simply missed the 
importance of regional supply constraints.  Even if most arts economists would be skeptical of 
any net positive spending impacts of locally based individual arts organizations and institutions, 
have they been wrong in their findings of net positive benefits from high profile arts events that 
clearly do bring visitors to their host cities and regions?5        
 
II.  Regional Supply Constraints 
A.  Further Description of the Problem  
 It is well known that unless there is significant import substitution, sports, arts or other 
institutions can have no net incremental regional effect on jobs, income and output if the 
audiences that it attracts are entirely localized, hence generating only diversions of spending 
from one sector to another without injecting any new economic activity into the region. Import 
substitution will occur if local residents would have spent a portion of their income outside the 
relevant region (typically on non-localized substitutes) had it not been for the existence of the 
local institution. A rare explicit measure of this effect was related to an event rather than an 
institution, when Gazel and Schwer (1997) identified 3,660 local Las Vegas residents attending a 
Grateful Dead (GD) concert (out of 4,134 such attendees) who “reported that they would travel 
someplace else to patronize the GD concerts in the absence of the show locally” (p. 49).   
O’Hagan (1992) provides another estimate of such import substitution related to an event in 
noting that about 10 per cent of Irish attendees of the Wexford Festival “indicated that they 
would have taken a holiday outside Ireland if the Festival had not been on” (p. 65).  
Interestingly, there may be a reverse effect in what might be called “import 
enhancement” resulting from the development by local arts institutions of a greater interest in 
                                                 
5  Seaman (2003b) compares and contrasts the cultural economics and the sports economics literatures in the hope of 
encouraging more collaboration across these related areas.  Since the focus is on labor market analysis, the common 
problems confronted in conducting economic impact, as well as contingent valuation studies, is mentioned only in 
passing.   
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cultural consumption that then stimulates more tourist visits by local residents to non-local 
destinations to partially satisfy their demand for the arts.   Thus, a reasonable conclusion is that, 
given the limited and contradictory evidence regarding import substitution, institutions that 
largely serve local audiences may generate substantial local consumption benefits, but will not 
generate any measurable output, income, jobs or tax revenue effects.6   
However, can sports, arts, or other local institutions, or even more likely, significant 
events that clearly do attract large numbers of freely spending visitors from outside the region 
ever yield a similarly de minimis economic impact?   Yes, but only if such visitors substantially 
displace (crowd-out) other equally or more freely spending visitors who must not just postpone, 
but permanently cancel their trips to the region.7  Note that this crowding-out effect is quite 
distinct from the incorporation of the negative effects on a community of enhanced tourism 
development linked to additional policing, clean-up, or traffic control expenditures (see, e.g. 
Fleming and Toepper, 1990, who call for a balancing of these negative as well as positive effects 
of tourism).  If the crowding-out of customary tourists by mega-event visitors is truly significant, 
such additional local government expenditures will be minimal since the net increase in tourists 
will itself be minimal.     
  While it is widely recognized that this can theoretically happen, it has been rare (until 
relatively recently) to make any adjustments for this displacement effect, much less to claim that 
full 100 percent displacement will ever occur.  This is particularly true in the arts, where the 
problem is only mentioned in passing (with the exception of Skinner, 2006), or a quite different 
aspect of supply capacity constraints is addressed.  For example: 
• Johnson and Thomas (1992) provide a very thorough analysis of the economic impact of 
the Open Air Museum of Beamish in northern England, but note merely that “possible 
supply constraints" (and also the role of competitors as a separate issue) “have not been 
examined” (p. 76). 
                                                 
6  For example, Bille Hansen (1997) justifies her focus on a contingent valuation assessment of the benefits from the 
Royal Theatre in Copenhagen by noting  “the primary purpose of cultural activities is not to attract tourists, but to 
provide enriching experiences for the citizenry” (p. 2).  
 
7 Of course, the relevant issue is not just the aggregate spending but the type of spending, since spending that 
accrues to local rather than “foreign” vendors, or that lands in the hands of local labor forces rather than 
“carpetbaggers” will have a larger effect on both the initial direct base impact, and the subsequent multiplier effects.      
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• Mitchell (1993) provides a generally positive assessment of the impact of theatre festivals 
in small Ontario communities, but then observes in concluding that the benefits provided 
to communities by such summer theatre companies depend on their ability to attract a 
non-local market and the adequacy of the “tourist infrastructure required to sustain 
visitors” (p. 65). The earlier Mitchell (1989) examination of the Stratford, Shaw and 
Blyth festivals also mentions the tourist infrastructure, but implicitly assumes a highly 
elastic supply of such tourist services in concluding that employment benefits increase 
with festival size since “visitors who travel to attend a performance at a festival demand 
services to sustain them while in the community,” and smaller festivals just do not 
require a large tourist infrastructure (p. 77).    
• Acheson et al. (1996) identifies significant challenges that have confronted the organizers 
of the Banff Television Festival, including “the timing of competing events, the seasonal 
pressures of the business, the local weather and accommodation considerations” 
(emphasis added) (p. 326), but this last factor receives little attention. 
• Frey (1994) addresses supply issues, but not local infrastructure supply constraints.  He 
examines the incentives influencing the increasing supply of music festivals, focusing on 
the potential private profitability and increased artistic freedom to the organizers 
(especially in Europe) rather than any infrastructure supply constraints that might limit a 
region's ability to host such increasingly popular festivals.  Interestingly, his observations 
that “attending a festival performance is often an integral part of a holiday to a particular 
region” (p. 32) and that “most festivals take place during the holiday season” (p. 31) in an 
era of increasing demand for holiday travel, hint at the possibility that at least some 
existing holiday travelers could indeed be crowded out by those travelers motivated in 
part by festivals.  While he identifies potentially new groups of arts consumers attracted 
to festivals who might not otherwise regularly patronize the arts, it is unclear to what 
extent the hospitality infrastructure of a city or region is capable of accommodating both 
these new arts consumers and regular visitors at the same time.  What is clear is that the 
demand for some events such as the Salzburg Festival is so high that tickets are 
extremely hard to obtain (worsened by sub-equilibrium pricing; Frey, 1986, 2001).  It is 
therefore no surprise that any tourists who might have planned to visit Salzburg during 
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that period for reasons other than the festival would be advised to cancel or at least 
postpone their visit.  
• Caserta and Russo (2002) provide the most explicit consideration of “spatial 
displacement” but stress the somewhat different problem of the diminution of the quality 
of the travel experience to heritage sites. When demand continues to grow while the 
quantity of the cultural products themselves (primary goods) is constant, and the related 
accommodation supply (secondary goods) is “constrained in the center, infinite in the 
periphery” (p. 248), the result is often “a bad meal, an unfriendly ticket office, or 
excessively crowded public transport” (p. 246).   While they then model the conditions 
for “sustainable tourism” in heritage cities and warn of the threat of tourist decline,8 this 
is still ultimately an argument about the long term size of the cultural heritage visitor 
market rather than a consideration of how such visitors are crowding out other visitors, 
hence potentially yielding limited or no net economic benefits to the city or region.    
 
B.  Assumptions that Might Justify Ignoring Supply Constraints   
What might account for this failure in arts economic impact studies (and in some other 
high profile studies) to more explicitly consider regional supply constraints?  Four assumptions 
(often implicit) could justify failing to seriously consider normal visitor displacement caused by 
such constraints. While a key part of the sports literature focusing on supply constraints is linked 
to innovative empirical work that demonstrates minimal effects on dependent variables such as 
tax receipts, personal income, or employment, the emphasis in this section is on conceptual 
rather than empirical issues.   
Four key assumptions: 
• Major events such as the Summer or Winter Olympic Games, Super Bowls, World Cup 
Soccer matches, the Salzburg (Mozart) Festival, the Cannes Film Festival or lesser highly 
publicized events such as collegiate sports championship games (e.g. in the United States, 
the NCAA basketball regional and “final four” tournament events) are well-known so far 
in advance that conventions and other tourist visits can easily be rescheduled to avoid any 
 
8  Frey (2001) cites the corrosive effects of public subsidy as a different kind of endogenous reason for the decline in 
the quality of cultural goods (in his case music festivals), and hence the long term “fall of festivals” following their 
initial success.    
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conflict with these “mega-events.”  The annual events that are linked to one location are 
clearly anticipated, but even the events with fluctuating venues are generally subject to 
intense media coverage that would alert planners of competing events and even 
individual tourists to avoid those specific dates.  In fact, this assumption was explicitly 
made regarding the 1996 Atlanta Summer Olympics by two well-known economic 
forecasters within the state of Georgia in their respective projections (Donald Ratacjzak 
of the Georgia State University Economic Forecasting Center, and Jeffrey Humphreys of 
the University of Georgia’s Selig Center for Economic Growth).    
• Some visitor displacement will occur, but it is likely to be sufficiently small that it will be 
counterbalanced by the existence (discussed above) of local residents who will divert into 
the region some spending that they would otherwise do outside of the area as a result of 
being attracted to these mega-events occurring in their back yard.  That is, the 
conservative assumption that all spending done locally by residents at a particular 
institution or local event is merely a diversion from other local sectors is a simplification, 
but a useful one that is essentially accurate.  However, there is no denying that especially 
attractive local events are capable of causing import-substitution effects as local residents 
substitute them for travel to non-local alternatives.  Thus, the practice of not making a 
downward adjustment for visitor displacement might be rationalized by the absence of 
making an upward adjustment for resident “non-displacement.” Obviously, such casual 
rule-of-thumb balancing adjustments are always inferior to obtaining more accurate data 
about both visitor and resident displacement, but such data may not reliably be available. 
• Even if the customary flow of visitors is not adequately shifted to other time periods by 
the advance notification of these mega-events, there is sufficient excess-capacity in the 
local economy, specifically in the tourist/hospitality sector, to accommodate both the 
normal flow of visitors and the exogenous shock of additional visitors attracted to the 
special events. Thus, supply-side constraints are sufficiently non-binding to allow the 
focus of the analysis to be on net demand-side effects uncomplicated by such constraints. 
O’Hagan (1992) explicitly stresses this point in his discussion of the economically 
depressed state of the Wexford, Ireland area, and the scheduling of the Festival at an off-
peak time of the year (p. 65).    
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• There may in fact be some crowding out of normal visitors, but visitors to the event in 
question spend more than such ordinary visitors, hence generating a net increase in 
economic activity despite the supply constraint problem.  While it is not uncommon to 
claim such differential spending habits, it is rare to actually provide specific offsets to the 
spending of visitors to a specific event to account for such displacement (e.g. Vaughn, 
1980 notes both differential spending by visitors to the Edinburgh Festival and ordinary 
visitors as well as differential propensities to choose particular housing accommodations, 
but does not explicitly weigh these relative factors despite a thorough analysis overall).  
Vaughan and Booth (1989) and Varette (1987) also stress the differential spending habits 
of distinct types of visitors to local regions.      
 
C.  Displacement Effects in Sports vs. the Arts 
 The generally passive treatment of supply constraints in the arts becomes especially 
noteworthy when contrasted with the remarkable literature that is developing in sports economics 
(cited above), and also spilling over into a less technical backlash against such high profile 
events as the Olympic Games.  Sports economists are increasingly avoiding ex post verification 
errors by making serious attempts to try to validate the projections that are made in typical 
impact studies.   
To the extent that such studies demonstrate that (1) individual sports franchises or (2) 
sports stadiums and arenas, fail to generate any measurable incremental gain in jobs, income, 
output or tax revenues for their cities or regions, little fundamental challenge is posed to 
economic impact methodology.  Such minimal effects are predictable when the patronage of 
teams is primarily local, much of the expense of the teams such as player salaries accrues to 
those who do not live in the local area,9 and stadium deals between wealthy private team owners 
and local governments often turn into perverse rent-seeking arrangements at the expense of the 
tax-paying public (e.g., Noll and Zimbalist, 1997; Zimmerman, 1997; Baade and Sanderson, 
1997; Keating, 2001).10   
 
9  As argued by Siegfried and Zimbalist (2002): “Sports expenditures are subject to extraordinary consumer 
substitution away from other local expenditures, and they suffer unusually large first round leakages…” The role of 
non-local players in such leakages is dramatic: “While 93% of the average employees live in the area in which they 
work, only 29% of the NBA players do the same” (p. 361).   
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Thus the Coates and Humphreys (2001) finding that sports strikes and lockouts, as well 
as the permanent departure of professional basketball teams from specific cities, have had no 
adverse effects on the SMSA’s in which the affected teams were located, is a noteworthy but not 
shocking result.  It is one that should be easily believed by cultural economists.  A related but 
distinct inquiry has focused on whether there have been longer-term positive economic effects 
upon the cities of successful sports teams (i.e. either those who qualify for post-season playoffs, 
or who actually win championships).  Coates and Humphreys (2002) find no such effects in the 
level of per-capita income from 1969-1997 in those cities having their teams in post-season play, 
but they do find that in the “city that is home to the winning team from the Super Bowl, real per 
capita personal income is found to be higher by about $140, perhaps reflecting a link between 
winning the Super Bowl and the productivity of workers in cities” (p. 291).    
While such a real productivity result would fascinate cultural economists who have long 
searched for tangible confirmation of the more fundamental “intangible” benefits of the arts 
beyond pure consumption benefits or the questionable pecuniary effects of short run spending 
impacts, Matheson (2003) revisits the Coates and Humphreys (2002) results and develops 
evidence that their Super Bowl effect may well be no more than an anomaly (as suspected by 
Coates and Humphreys themselves).  Baade and Matheson (2003) provide further evidence 
against any such benefits of sports championships and call such successes “the gift that keeps on 
taking” (p. 10).    
  This is not to suggest that an individual sports franchise or arts organization could not 
have a legitimate net positive economic spending impact on a well-defined geographical area – 
certainly numerous studies have at least claimed such positive effects.11  However, since ex post 
                                                                                                                                                             
10  William Schaffer apparently does concede one possible exception regarding stadiums: “There is actually a case of 
a sports stadium working.  The Roman Coliseum is a boon to Rome because it has drawn about 2,000 years of 
tourism, but it’s difficult to find another similar stadium” (quote taken from Lehrer (1998)).  It is unclear whether 
even this observation would apply after controlling for (1) the actual incremental effect of the Coliseum in being the 
prime motivation for visits to Rome; see e.g. Stanley et al. (2000) for a detailed examination of these motivations 
regarding Ontario art exhibitions, and (2) the regional supply constraints stressed by Porter and others.   
11  Fort (2003) provides a useful review of such studies in sports, which have generally been conducted related to 
energetic debates in local communities and states about public subsidization of stadiums and even teams.  For 
example, Conway and Byers (1994) contrasted “total activity” from “new activity” and found 1993 new activity 
spending impacts for the Seattle Mariners baseball team ranging from $42.9 million to $53.3 million (ranging across 
city, county and state).  They also found (1996) such impacts for the Seattle Seahawks football team ranging from 
$66.7 million to $76.2 million in 1995.  Gapinski (1987) provides a survey of earlier arts and other studies, while 
Radich (1990) provides a more comprehensive overview in the arts, both focusing on the economic impacts of 
individual theaters, orchestras, opera and dance companies.  A particularly ambitious effort was the collaboration of 
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statistical studies remain rare even in sports, and have been almost non-existent in the arts, such 
claims have not been rigorously tested.   Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that whenever such data 
and analysis have been available in the sports case, the evidence usually suggests that the 
impacts generated by customary methods significantly overstate the realized impacts (e.g. Fort, 
2003, pp. 325-328).12   Again, only in the single econometric arts study of ex post impacts was 
contrary evidence found that such overstatements were not present (with a prediction of as many 
as 700 incremental jobs linked to ongoing museum sponsorships of blockbuster exhibits; 
Skinner, 2006).  While one might remain skeptical of such a result, sophisticated time-series 
techniques were used with a focus on correcting possible overstatements of these impacts.  
 On the other hand, the more customary minimal (or even perverse) ex post impacts are 
hardly anticipated for mega-events such as the Super Bowl in professional American football and 
the World Cup in soccer, and lesser sporting events such as All Star games, and various high-
profile tournaments.  And there are increasing claims that the Olympics fail to generate 
measurable economic rewards for the host cities (not just that the organizing committees may 
lose money, which has been proven time and again).13 However, in addition to Skinner (2006), 
 
the American for the Arts and 33 local arts agencies in generating Jobs, Arts, and The Economy, which also purports 
to provide any arts organization in the United States with a handy “fill-in-the-spaces” formula to prove the positive 
impacts on their local communities.  This approach is almost destined to generate overstated impacts.     
 
12  There are cases in which rigorous statistical analysis would not appear necessary to render such a negative 
conclusion.  One example is the Ernst and Young study of the relocation of the Atlanta Symphony Orchestra to an 
entirely new facility (a compelling change for artistic reasons), which would also include mixed-use development on 
the site such as housing and hotel accommodations.  Annual revenue from all sources to the Orchestra is about $25 
million (from the annual reports of the Woodruff Arts Center).  The projected ten year economic impact of $900 
million in economic output, $350 million in personal income, 800 jobs, and $35 million in additional tax revenues 
for the entire project (as reported by the Southern Arts Federation) was widely cited as evidence of the economic 
benefits of the orchestra. However this clearly requires very creative reasoning in order to find such effects in the 
mere relocation by one block of an organization largely serving a localized audience, even after subtracting the 
significant non-orchestra portion of the project.   
 
13  Ironically, two of the more entertaining overviews of these arguments, including good citations to specific 
studies, stem from the local opposition to Vancouver’s bid to host the 2010 winter Games.   Smits (2002) introduces 
his contribution with: “warning – long rant,” and can be found at http://www.creativeresistence.ca/awareness/2002-
sept17-olympic-bid-and-why-we-should -oppose-it.htm.  He cites, among others, Philip Porter’s claim that 
consumer sales, hotel occupancy rates, and airport usage during the summer of 1996 were no different in Atlanta 
than any other summer (more about this below in the text).  Another “creative resistance” anti-Olympic “sound bite” 
can be found at http://whistlerolympicinfo.com/sound%2bites.htm#priorities.   Of course, in June of 2003, 
Vancouver did indeed win the 2010 Games, much to the consternation of both the British Columbia resistance, and 
my long-time personal friend Heinz Schaden, mayor of one of the competing cities of Salzburg, who I was visiting 
at the time.      
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one very important exception to the “rule” that sophisticated econometric analysis finds evidence 
of minimal economic impact is the finding by Georgia State University economists that the 1996 
Atlanta Summer Games “boosted employment by 17% [293,000 jobs] in the counties of Georgia 
affiliated with and close to Olympic activity, relative to employment increases in the other 
counties in Georgia,” and also that even in the northern Olympic venue areas (away from the 
main metro-area venues) this employment effect was 11%, although only a weak Olympic effect 
on wages was found (Hotchkiss et al., 2003, p. 691).  Furthermore, positive effects on the rate of 
growth of employment were found, and these effects extended through the period of their 
analysis in 2000.    
  While Olympics effects thus remain disputed, if it can plausibly be demonstrated that 
most or even many major sports events, that so clearly attract sizeable and often high spending 
visitors to a city or region, cannot generate net gains in jobs or tax revenues, it would be very 
tempting to conclude that almost no festival or major arts related event is likely to generate such 
benefits as well. Of course, perhaps the true sporting mega-events are just “too huge to succeed” 
(in an ironic reversal of the usual sentiment), and that smaller scale arts festivals are just “too 
insignificant to fail” (although some are hardly small events).  A particular case study can 
provide further insights into the analysis of the adequacy of the local economic infrastructure 
when conducting an economic impact study.  
 
D.  An Analysis of Local Infrastructure: The 2000 Super Bowl in Atlanta 
 It is first necessary to provide a bit of personal background.  Some time ago I joined my 
Georgia State University (GSU) economist colleague Donald Ratacjzak (several time winner, 
now partially retired, of national economic forecasting awards for his work in the GSU 
Economic Forecasting Center) in assisting the Atlanta Sports Council (ASC), in cooperation with 
accounting firm McKinsey & Company, in developing an economic impact model that could be 
flexibly applied to analyze the many major sports events that the ASC hoped to attract to 
Atlanta.14   
 
 
14  While I also have strong contacts within the Atlanta arts community, and just recently (May 2004) made a 
presentation noting the weaknesses of economic impact studies at a mini-conference on the stage of the Alliance 
Theater, my role has more typically been as a source of press quotations critical of local arts studies focused upon 
individual organizations, such as the Atlanta Symphony Orchestra study cited above, and the locally beloved 
 14
                                                                                                                                                            
The ASC ambitiously sought two goals: (1) in typical over-hyped Atlanta fashion, to 
have the city become the “sports capital of the United States,” and more nobly (2) to become the 
authority on conducting defensible economic impact studies that would not merely be public 
relations fiascos, but would gain the reputation in the entire sports community as paragons of 
conservatism and academic respectability.15  After the early formulation stage, I alone have 
persisted in working with the ASC in fine-tuning the model and evaluating the results of every 
study they have conducted (up to the present), prior to their public dissemination.   
It was in this role that I became heavily involved in the economic impact study of Super 
Bowl XXXIV held in Atlanta in January 2000.  This involvement included several meetings, and 
frequent email communications directly and indirectly with personnel from the National Football 
League (primarily with Jim Steeg, the NFL’s senior vice president of special events).  Since the 
prior year’s study of the Super Bowl in Miami had been especially criticized for claiming a 
metro area impact of $365 million, even the NFL was reasonably open to cooperating with the 
ASC’s stated goal of “getting this one right.”16   In comparisons of Super Bowl impact studies 
measured in 1992 dollars, the 1999 Miami study was the highest at $318 million with the overall 
average over thirteen games of $252 million, and the lowest being the 1994 Atlanta game at 
$158 million, based on a study conducted by Jeffrey Humphreys of the University of Georgia 
(Depken, II and Wilson, 2003).   
The ASC study of the 2000 Super Bowl resulted in a $215 million (nominal dollars) 
impact upon metropolitan Atlanta and a $292 million impact on the state of Georgia, with this 
 
Marietta Theatre in the Square, that had courageously done battle over artistic freedom with conservative forces in 
suburban Cobb County, home of Newt Gingrich.  For that reason alone, I was a reluctant critic to be sure.   
 
15  The ASC has succeeded in gaining visibility for the economic impacts of Atlanta based sports events, as 
evidenced in part by Fort (2003) devoting a full-page table (Table 9-2, p. 316) to “Atlanta Economic Activity Value 
1999-2003,” based on an article on the subject in the Sports Business Journal, January 24, 2000.  While that 
particular table identifies only the estimated values prior to the studies being completed, Fort is utterly unique in 
accurately identifying the metro Atlanta impact result of $215 million (in the table as part of “advanced problem 8 
on page 335), rather than the commonly quoted and often misinterpreted $292 million longer term statewide result.  
See the text discussion that follows. 
 
16  There were nevertheless occasional tensions as we severely questioned some of the data that could not be 
obtained from our own surveys and interviews, especially those related to NFL spending itself as well as the 
magnitude and nature of the significant corporate sponsored events that are a hallmark of Super Bowl week.  The 
NFL was also not thrilled to hear that any position we might take regarding a positive net economic impact of this 
mega-event in Atlanta and Georgia in no way suggested that there was any justification for public funding of sports 
stadiums or subsidization of local sports teams.  While the ASC itself was neutral on that issue, I was not.   
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latter figure translating into $250 million in 1992 dollars.   Depken, II and Wilson (2003) are 
typical in only reporting the higher statewide, but not the 26 percent lower metropolitan area 
result (but see footnote 15).  Depken II (2004) reviewed the basic findings of the 2000 Atlanta 
study in his commentary in the Houston Business Journal regarding the expectations of the 
Houston area for the 2004 game.  While he did not seem aware that the $292 million was a 
statewide and not a metro area figure, he concludes that the multiplier used in the Atlanta study 
was “a bit smaller than most economists would expect,” but that the per diem spending figures 
seemed questionably high.  Overall, he concludes that the Atlanta figures are possible (especially 
given the pre-terrorist attack economic climate) but offers an alternative estimate that would 
incorporate lower per diem spending assumptions.  He finds that if the unadjusted 2000 Atlanta 
findings were extrapolated to the Houston case, the result would represent less than 0.2 percent 
of economic activity (actually measured as personal income) at the county level.  This leads him 
to stress the relatively minor effect of the economic impact (compared to civic pride issues) 
rather than question whether the economic impact would be too great to be plausible.                    
 Super Bowl XXXV (in the following year 2001) generated considerable controversy in 
part because it was held in Tampa, Florida, and Philip Porter (based at the University of South 
Florida) wrote high profile attacks on the impact studies being generated for that region.  His 
commentary differed significantly from the later Depken II (2004) Houston discussion, both in 
not directly addressing the 2000 Atlanta study (although writing an opinion piece for the Atlanta 
Business Chronicle, 2001a) and in concluding that the economic impact on Tampa would 
actually be nearly zero.   
Porter (2001a; 2001b) chided the Tampa Bay Super Bowl Task Force for not 
commissioning an independent study aided by economists before announcing that the January 28 
event would have an economic impact of $250 million on the Tampa Bay area bringing more 
than 100,000 visitors to the area (no figures were cited beyond Tampa, and this figure was no 
doubt based on the averages cited above from past studies, which in part mixed metro and state 
results).  He made his familiar argument that the lack of sufficient excess capacity in a local 
economy prevents such a large output response following such dramatic short term increases in 
visitor demand for goods and services (including but not limited to hotel rooms and airline 
flights) and claimed that the 100,000 Super Bowl visitors merely displace other visitors who 
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would have injected new spending into the region had there never been a Super Bowl.  He has 
always argued that the primary effect of such mega-events is that local hotel (and perhaps other) 
prices increase creating at best significant distributional effects within the local economy. Thus, 
by distinguishing between “gross” visitors and “net” visitors, he argued that the net aggregate 
economic impact of a Super Bowl on Tampa and other host cities is much closer to $0.   Finally, 
he cited “stable” gross sales figures for both Super Bowl and non-Super Bowl years for Tampa's 
previous 1984 and 1991 experiences as evidence consistent with his argument.   When read by 
the Atlanta business community not previously familiar with his academic writings, the reaction 
was clearly, “how can he be right?” 
Since this argument was an obvious challenge to the legitimacy of the 2000 ASC study 
that I had participated in and approved, I felt compelled to respond (Seaman, 2001, which was a 
greatly shortened version of the full analysis).  Among the rebuttal arguments that focused on the 
Atlanta situation in 2000 (many of which did not survive the editorial cuts) were the following:    
1) The $215 million impact on metro Atlanta represents about 0.2 percent of the 
typical annual output of the Atlanta metro economy (interestingly, the same 
percentage figure later derived by Depken II for Houston). 
2) Ignoring visitor displacement, the Atlanta study was extremely diligent in 
deriving the direct first round economic impact figures.   It conducted visitor 
surveys and interviewed hotel managers, rental car facility operators, restaurant 
and other business personnel.   It distinguished diversions of spending of local 
area residents (which entered as $0) from new spending by out-of area visitors 
(despite the fact that some local spending was in fact reimbursed by non-local 
corporate headquarters, and the real prospect that some local residents may have 
altered plans to spend vacation funds elsewhere to be present for this relatively 
unusual event), made adjustments for that portion of visitor spending that would 
immediately leave the area (as with hotel and other profits that flow to non-local 
corporate headquarters) and for payments to non-local vendors and suppliers of 
goods and services (such as the manufacturer and wholesale portions of the retail 
price paid by visitors). 
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3) It distinguished per diem food and entertainment spending by those staying in 
hotels (87% of visitors) from the somewhat lower spending for those items of 
non-hotel guests    It adjusted lavish corporate entertainment spending for local 
area components, and applied the local/non-local distinction also to media 
spending.   It slashed the NFL budgetary figures that applied to the promotion and 
execution of the Super Bowl to more accurately reflect that portion that would 
actually be paid to local vendors and workers, and adjusted ticket revenues to 
reflect only that portion that would accrue back to local organizations.  And 
despite the fact that some of the $7.5 million in local “bid” money paid to the 
NFL was recycled back into the local economy, none of those expenditures was 
included in the direct economic impact.   In short, the $137 million of direct 
economic impact derived for metro Atlanta was the result of many conservative 
adjustments consistent with well-known criticisms of economic impact studies. 
While Professor Porter would clearly applaud such adjustments, he would still ask 
whether most if not all of that $137 million in “injected spending” merely displaces spending 
that would otherwise have occurred without the Super Bowl.  His own argument (2001a; 2001b) 
focused on Tampa, where he questioned the feasibility of the Tampa economy being able to 
adapt to a two-day extravaganza of massive increased spending demand (concluding that Tampa 
would have to double its sale of almost everything compared to its “normal” levels, even to 
absorb 25 percent of the $250 million claimed impact).  Continuing to play devil’s advocate 
against this argument, it is important to stress that the direct impact of the Super Bowl is derived 
over a much longer period than just two days (not only did the Atlanta survey find an average 
hotel visitor stay of 3.7 days, but the media arrives a week in advance of the event, the period 
from the start of setting up the stadium for the event and closing down afterwards is as much as 
23 days, and NFL personnel are traveling to the host city to help with arrangements more than 
one year in advance).    
Furthermore, the total impact (such as the $215 million for Atlanta) includes indirect 
longer-term impacts that may take months to be fully realized (applying a multiplier of 0.57 to 
the $137 million Atlanta direct impact yielded $78 million in such indirect impacts).   In 
addition, Super Bowls are hardly unexpected events and the announcement that Atlanta was to 
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host Super Bowl XXXIV was, in fact, made four years in advance.  Thus, normal visitors and 
event planners have considerable time to make slight adjustments in their plans to visit the host 
city so as to avoid the last week in January, which is not a big tourist period in Atlanta17 
(although, admittedly, the increasing lead times for the organization of large conventions now 
can extends to significantly more than four years).  In fact, three major Georgia World Congress 
Center (GWCC) events that are annually scheduled for January (including the massive 
International Poultry Show) took place as scheduled in 2000 (there were slightly more GWCC 
events in January 2000 than there were in January 1999).   Thus, while the Atlanta study was 
sensitive to the displacement issue, it specifically rejected displacement as a serious issue 
requiring major adjustments to the findings.   
                                                 
17  As fate would have it, the day of the 2000 Super Bowl in the Georgia Dome was one of the coldest for that date 
in Atlanta history.  January is normally much less extreme, but never particularly pleasant. 
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But the ex post verification studies in the sports economics literature are compelling and 
cannot be ignored.  To specifically demonstrate why displacement could in fact be minimal for 
Atlanta, consider the following data (note that all host cities have unique features that would 
require a separate case by case study; but it is likely that similar a priori considerations could 
also reduce the concern about displacement for some of these cities, while elevating it for 
others).    
1) The value of all goods and services produced in Georgia in 2000 was over $220 
billion.  The large geographical area known as metro-Atlanta has somewhat over 
50 percent of the state population, but is known to contribute more than that 
proportionate share to state output (probably about 55 percent).   Since many 
counties make up metro-Atlanta, while most of the Super Bowl activity is more 
narrowly focused (although suppliers of goods and services, and the work force is 
not similarly limited), the 50 percent figure yielding $110 billion per year in local 
“productive capacity” is reasonable.  
2) This can be translated into a per day output of goods and services of $301.37 
million.  The portion of the $137 million in direct impact (see above) representing 
visitor spending over the average stay of 3.7 days was $102.57 million, or $27.72 
million per day.  This is 9.2 per cent of normal metro Atlanta output.  The 
remaining roughly $34.43 million in first round direct spending is generated by 
the media, corporations sponsoring huge parties and the NFL, and extends over at 
least one week (remember also that the period from “set up” to “close down” is 
actually 23 days).  Assuming only seven days, this is an additional $4.92 million 
per day in additional demand for goods and services - only 1.6% of the normal 
output per day for metro Atlanta.  
3) Thus, in short run aggregate terms, the Atlanta Super Bowl added no more than 
about 10.8 per cent to the customary metro demand for goods and services (a far 
cry from the 100 per cent increase cited by Professor Porter for Tampa).  It seems 
possible that a combination of existing “excess capacity” and both supply and 
demand adjustments to this long anticipated event would allow the Atlanta 
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economy to meet this additional demand without crowding out other economic 
activity.   
Just how possible this is can be evaluated by an analysis of hotel and airline capacity 
applicable to the 2000 period.  Metro-Atlanta had about 75,000 total hotel rooms (15,130 of 
which are in the 25 largest hotels, which also have 585 suites).  An average of Ernst and Young 
and PKF studies yielded an average Atlanta hotel occupancy rate of 65.9%.   The Atlanta study 
identified 82,312 visitors (not all of whom had tickets for the game) staying in hotels.  Given the 
advance notification of the event, it is hardly unlikely that at least a 25 percent adjustment in this 
rate would result from leisure and business travelers and event planners modifying their plans to 
avoid the last week in January (and with a customary room availability rate of 34.1 percent, they 
would not fear being unable to make that adjustment).  This would yield an occupancy rate of 
49.43 percent, leaving 50.57 percent of the rooms available for the Super Bowl without crowding 
out other visitors.   The resulting available 7,651 rooms in “major” hotels, 30,276 rooms in 
“secondary” hotels and 296 suites (ignoring any such suites in non-major hotels) would 
accommodate Super Bowl visitors with average occupancy of a little over 2 people per room.    
A higher than 25 percent “advance notification” adjustment factor makes such accommodation 
much easier (and does not require full occupancy).  There seems to be no intrinsic reason to 
believe that anything like Professor Porter's full displacement is the general case. 
Not all host cities have the advantages of Atlanta Hartsfield International Airport 
(now Atlanta Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport), but then again, Hartsfield was  
straining in 2000 under the weight of serving 78.092 million passengers (the 1999 figure 
for domestic plus international, arriving plus departing passengers), and 909,911 total 
aircraft operations (also 1999).18  The Atlanta study identified 65,250 non-local game 
spectators, plus 29,362 “multiple day” non-game attending visitors (not including “day 
trippers” who drove to Atlanta for a day of Super Bowl atmosphere).  Of the 29,362  
visitors to metro Atlanta who did not have tickets to the game itself, 20 percent were 
estimated to be Georgians, some of whom would also have driven.  And a larger than 
normal percentage of the other 80 percent of non-attendees as well as those attending the 
game may have driven, since the relatively local Tennessee Titans team (from the 
bordering state to the north) were playing in the game.  Of course, media personnel also 
had to arrive in Atlanta, most by air.    
If 80,000 people had to fly to Atlanta, staggering their arrival over about a four 
day period, and their departure over a two day period, an additional per day average of 
20,000 arriving passengers prior to January 30, and 40,000 departing passengers after 
January 30 would have to be served.   With about 106,977 passengers landing per day at 
Hartsfield (destination plus transit), this 18.7 percent increase in arriving passengers 
would be burdensome, but hardly impossible to accommodate with some combination of 
higher occupancy on existing flights and the voluntary shifting of normal travelers away 
from the last week in January to other dates.   For example, with an average of an 
astonishing 1,246 landings per day (about 1 per minute over an 18 hour day), 20,000 
more people per day could be served by filling an average of 16 more seats on each 
landing aircraft.    Double that number of available empty seats would be needed to 
accommodate visitors leaving Atlanta over only two days.  Of course, those projections 
assume no advance notification scheduling adjustment, so that in reality, there would be 
fewer needed available empty seats.    Again, there is no reason to believe that Professor 
Porter's view that full displacement is an inevitable result is correct. 
                                                 
18  While some of the Hartsfield data (and the prior Georgia World Congress Center data) are easily 
available, this analysis of both hotel and airport capacity issues is greatly facilitated by having done two 
economic impact studies of  Hartsfield Atlanta International Airport since 1990 and a study in 2000 of the 
Georgia World Congress Center.. 
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 But what about the ex post empirical data cited by Porter?  Here, the focus is not 
on his published econometric work (e.g. Porter, 1999), but on his representations focused 
on the Tampa case.  Porter (2001a) cites evidence that recorded January sales in 
Hillsborough County (the primary country in the five county Tampa metro area) were 
never measurably higher in the Super Bowl years of 1984 and 1991, and in fact were 
somewhat lower in those years compared to 1983 and 1985 and 1990 and 1992.   He 
suggests that this has, in fact, been true of all Super Bowls - recorded sales in January “do 
not respond to the presence of a Super Bowl.”    
And, in fact, the Georgia Department of Revenue reported that total 
“distributions” in March for various local option sales tax revenues generated in January 
to Fulton, Cobb, DeKalb and Gwinnett Counties (including the MARTA 1 percent tax for 
Fulton and DeKalb Counties) were 14.6 percent lower in 2000 than they were in 1999.   
Of course, they also reported that such revenues were 27.8 percent higher in 1999 than 
they were in 1998.   Department personnel were unwilling to speculate about these 
baffling figures (while the economy began slowing down in late 2000, the consistently 
strong economy in all three years would predict neither the magnitude of the surge in 
January 1999 revenues, which predated any “wealth effect” from the 1999 dot.com 
boom, nor the sizeable drop in early 2000 revenues linked to the collapse).    
 While a more steady growth pattern in these three- year reported revenues would, 
indeed, have been more consistent with general knowledge of the Atlanta economy as 
well as more helpful to the pro-Super Bowl argument, nothing in the figures as they stand 
proves that there was no positive net economic impact of the Super Bowl.  Porter has 
generally not argued that Super Bowls cause sizeable actual declines in local sales tax 
collections (although Baade and Matheson, 2001 do claim outright negative economic 
effects related to Major League Baseball All Star games).   In fact, the Atlanta study's 
projected local tax revenues from the Super Bowl could merely be viewed (self-
servingly, as usual in such situations) as having prevented an even larger drop in such 
revenues (a drop of about 16 percent).   Such “casual” statistics are suggestive, but not 
determinative, and clearly nothing said here can substitute for a more thorough 
econometric analysis in the spirit of those being increasingly done in the sports literature 
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(e.g. Porter, 1999; Coates and Humphreys, 2001; 2002; Baade and Matheson, 2000; 
2001).   
In this context, the positive employment findings of Hotchkiss et al. (2003) regarding 
the 1996 Atlanta Summer Olympics based on sophisticated empirical techniques is 
important in preventing any rush to judgment that empirical analysis will inevitably 
invalidate the major findings of economic impact studies.  Even more remarkably, their 
finding that such job gains were as high as 293,000 is a seemingly rare case of the ex post 
economic impact exceeding that predicted by an economic impact study.  Humphreys and 
Plummer (1994) projected 77,000 full and part-time job gains (Table 4).    
Furthermore, the above discussion of the Atlanta Super Bowl debate at least suggests 
that the extent to which local hospitality and transportation infrastructures would generate 
full displacement and zero economic impacts will vary across events and locations, and 
that net positive economic impacts from major events that generate significant gross 
visitor flows cannot be ruled out.  Supply constraints do, however, clearly represent a 
factor that must be considered in determining the magnitude of overstatement inherent in 
short run economic impact studies, and the absence of more explicit considerations of 
such constraints in studies of major cultural events is a potentially troubling weakness 
even in otherwise well-designed “sophisticated” economic impact studies.     
 
III.  Summary  
Coates and Humphreys (2001) concede that there is a legitimate issue in using a  
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) as the unit of analysis of the potential 
adverse economic effects of a sports strike or the departure of a sports franchise, 
observing “perhaps SMASs are large enough relative to the size of a professional sports 
team to obscure the effects of a strike” (p. 740).  While they go on to defend their choice 
of that unit of analysis, other sports economists conducting ex post statistical tests of 
economic impact claims have cautiously recognized the complexity of isolating such 
effects, or interpreting the absence of any evidence of such effects.  However, the 
sentiment is clear that given the nature of the claims being made by economic impact 
studies, especially for the larger tourist based events, there should be some evidence of a 
footprint in the sand of the local economy.   
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 While everyone involved in the sports literature recognizes the need for further 
research to clarify these questions, and there is a clear opening to apply such statistical 
techniques more widely to arts cases as well to further determine whether the literature on 
arts festivals is fundamentally flawed, the following summary observations can be made: 
o Porter’s claim that the primary local impact of Super Bowls and other 
mega-sports events is on higher hotel prices and revenues must be 
squared with well-known “anti-gauging” agreements that are required by 
the National Football League (and also typically by the International 
Olympic Committee).  While economists would naturally be skeptical of 
the efficacy of such agreements, it cannot just be presumed that they are 
totally devoid of substance.  As noted by Depken, II and Wilson (2003), 
there is evidence that hotel occupancy rates are between 1.24 percent and 
7.3 percent higher than the same month of the previous year when a city 
hosts the Super Bowl, suggesting that there are quantity as well as price 
adjustments to mega-event demand shocks. 
o At the same time, the Depken, II and Wilson (2003) observation that 
“most economic impact studies implicitly assume that hotel occupancy 
would have been zero without the event” is too strong a characterization.  
As revealed by the detailed examination of hotel occupancy issues 
regarding the 2000 Atlanta Super Bowl, an assumption of zero hotel 
occupancy is certainly not required when arguing that a Super Bowl can 
have some net positive economic impact.   
o The Hotchkiss et al. (2003) empirical findings that the 1996 Atlanta 
Summer Olympics did have a noteworthy effect on job creation (not 
merely very short term), and that this effect exceeded that predicted by 
standard economic impact studies is either a total anomaly or a warning 
that careful empirical analysis of the actual experience of regions with 
large tourist events need not always generate “negative” findings.  The 
subsequent findings by Skinner (2006) of significant job creation effects 
of blockbuster museum exhibits in Mississippi (nearly identical to what 
might have been projected using standard ex ante economic impact 
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methods) is additional evidence, although such studies remain too rare in 
the arts case to draw any firm conclusions.  
o  There is some tension between the claim that local economies should 
reveal “footprints” of expanded economic activity in the wake of major 
sports (or arts) events, and the observation that when the economic impact 
figures are normalized by the size of the local economy, such impacts 
(even if overstated) are very small percentages of normal local economic 
activity (a figure of 0.2 percent was cited for both the Atlanta and the 
Houston Super Bowls, and would seemingly be much lower for the many 
arts festivals, although those festivals often take place in very small 
communities, hence suggesting that the percentage of economic activity 
represented by cultural events may well exceed that of major sports 
events).  Opponents of public funding of stadiums and sports teams will 
make this argument that any economic effects are “trivial” compared to 
the taxpayer investments being demanded.  But if they are indeed trivial, 
how serious can the supply constraint problem really be?   
o In resolving the tension between those two arguments, an analogy might 
be drawn with the negative relationship between the size of a regional 
multiplier and the size of the direct spending base impact itself.  Just as 
this relationship naturally limits the size of any economic impact (since a 
larger region will have a larger multiplier, but ceteris paribus will have a 
lower proportion of out-of-region visitors to events and institutions 
relative to locally based consumers, hence generating a smaller direct 
base impact upon which to apply that larger multiplier), there is a similar 
relationship operating on the supply-side.  A local area that already has a 
well-developed (large supply) of tourist related services and infrastructure 
is no doubt already a major tourist attraction (either for leisure travelers, 
e.g. San Francisco, or for business travelers, e.g. Atlanta).  Hence, a major 
event scheduled for that city would seemingly be more easily 
accommodated by that infrastructure, yet would be more likely to 
interfere with the travel plans of those already planning to visit for 
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entirely different reasons.  Contrast that with a smaller city such as 
Jacksonville, Florida, with a much more limited hospitality sector (hence 
generating the plan to house Super Bowl visitors to the 2005 game off 
shore on cruise ships), but also with a much smaller steady-state flow of 
normal visitors making demands on that infrastructure.  This classic 
simultaneity problem needs to be further explored as part of the effort to 
clarify the importance of regional supply constraints. 
Regardless of the status of the current debate on regional supply constraints in sports, it is 
clear that arts economists need to expand their efforts beyond a single ex post 
econometric study and join this debate in a serious way. 
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